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NEW JERSEY SOLAR TRANSITION Successor Program Candidate Policy Pathways

STAKEHOLDER WORKSHOP #3 THE CADMUS GROUP LLC DECEMBER 17, 2019



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Agenda

Time	Agenda Item
9:30 – 9:45 AM	Opening Remarks Review of the Day's Agenda
9:45 AM – 10:30 AM	Presentation and Q&A 1.Objectives for the Successor Program 2.Policy Options for Designing the Successor Program
10:30 AM – 12:05 PM	Breakout Groups: Discussion of Potential Policy Options and Design of Successor Program
12:05 – 12:15 PM	Breakout Session Report Back
12:15 – 12:30 PM	Wrap Up, Next Steps & Meeting Closed



Consulting Team Supporting Stakeholder Engagement Facilitator Roster



Chad Laurent



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BPU Staff will co-facilitate workshop breakouts



Development of Successor Program Design Criteria



Consistency with Core Principles

Translate Original Solar Transition Principles into SP Design Criteria

Solar Transition Principle

- 1. Provide maximum benefit to ratepayers at the lowest cost
- 2. Support the continued growth of the solar industry

- 3. Ensure that prior investments retain value
- 4. Meet the Governor's commitment of 50% Class I Renewable Energy Certificates ("RECs") by 2030 and 100% clean energy by 2050

Successor Plan Design Criteria

Maximize ratepayer benefit and/or minimize ratepayer cost

Support solar industry growth, with an emphasis on community solar, rooftop, and landfill resources, while minimizing use of productive agricultural or forested lands

N/A

Meet IEP targets of ~12.2 GW of solar by 2030, with the goal of 100% of New Jersey's hourly load served by renewables by 2050

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Consistency with Core Principles

Translate Original Solar Transition Principles into SP Design Criteria

Solar Transition Principle

- 5. Provide insight and information to stakeholders through a transparent process for developing the Solar Transition and Successor Program
- 6. Comply fully with the statute, including the implications of the cost cap
- 7. Provide disclosure and notification to developers that certain projects may not be guaranteed participation in the current SREC program, and continue updates on market conditions via the New Jersey Clean Energy Program ("NJCEP") SREC Registration Program ("SRP") Solar Activity Reports

Successor Plan Design Criteria

N/A - accomplished through meetings and other stakeholder outreach

Binding constraint: comply with Cost Cap and maintain flexibility to incorporate findings of Cost Cap proceeding

N/A - BPU provided notice to SRP applicants



Translate Higher Priority Stakeholder Objectives into Primary Design Criteria

Stakeholder Objective	Successor Plan Design Criteria
Fairness to those who have made past commitments and to those who will make future ones	Seek fairness for those who will make future commitments
Transparency	Provide clarity and transparency regarding pricing and project eligibility
Minimize market disruption	Provide timely guidance on program details
Support steady industry growth	Support steady industry growth

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Translate Higher Priority Stakeholder Objectives into Primary Design Criteria

Stakeholder Objective		Successor Plan Design Criteria
Favor support to open or rolling market incentives vs. scheduled procurements		Maximize certainty of incentive access
Minimize complexity		Minimize complexity
Focus on feasible implementation		Ensure feasibility

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Translate Other Priority Stakeholder Objectives into Secondary Design Criteria

Stakeholder Objective		Successor Plan Design Criteria
Ensure cost effectiveness		Maximize cost-effectiveness (MW/ratepayer \$)
Minimize ratepayer impact		Minimize ratepayer impact and/or maximizes ratepayer net benefit (including environmental considerations)
Transition to sustainable market by reducing incentive over time		Reflect current and forecast market pricing, which should decline over time
Balance solar development between the built environment and green space		Maximize solar development on disturbed land/minimizes reliance on green space
Encourage installation type diversity		Encourage installation type diversity
Minimize financing risk		Minimize financing risk

Translate Other Priority Stakeholder Objectives into Secondary Design Criteria

Stakeholder Objective	Successor Plan Design Criteria
Encourage participant diversity	Encourage participant diversity
Create and keep permanent in-state jobs	Maximize near- and long-term jobs in NJ
Prioritize competitive market structures	Maximize use of competitive market mechanisms and compatibility with competitive wholesale and retail markets
Accelerate implementation, timeliness of Transition	Allow timely implementation
Support PV location where most needed	Support PV location where most needed

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Successor Program Policy Path Development



Policy Path Choices





Choose Broad Incentive Type

Market Mechanism

- Solar Carve-out creates demand obligation
- Price is market-based but generally within bounds
- Levers include SACP, SREC life, qualification life, bankability, etc.
- Prior SREC program

Performance Based Incentives (PBIs)

- Direct payments for production
- Compensation for environmental attribute, energy, capacity, and/or other element
- Transition Incentive



Choose Payment Structure

Contract • Energy, capacity and/or SREC to EDC

Tariff

• EDC tariff approved by regulator

Premium PBI

• Payments for environmental attribute



Choose Price Setting Mechanism

Standard Offer

- Cap based on MW or \$ amount
- Price set as cost-/value-based or derivative of competitive process

Competitive Solicitation

• RFP, auction, other to set pricing

Separate SREC Market Based

- Supply from generation, banked SRECs
- Demand as required of obligors



Choose Price Adjusting Mechanism

Administrative

• Objective independent analysis of required incentive rate(s)

Blocks

• Preset, typically stepping down in MW or time increments

Separate SREC Market-Based

• Price a function of demand & supply



Choose Compensation Structure

Premium

 In addition to energy/capacity revenues, primarily reflecting environmental attributes

Fixed Price

• Meant to compensate for all primary revenue streams

Fixed Compensation

 Set total compensation but PBI fills gap beyond conventional market value streams



Other Incentive Choices and Finer Tuning

Market Mechanism

- Obligor entities EDCs or TPS/BGS companies
- Setting carve-out %
- Bankability
- Qualification Life
- Lever adjustments over time
- Floor characteristics

Performance Based Incentive

- What is purchased (hedged)
- Access
- Block makeup, adjustability
- Portability among blocks

Both

- Differentiate by type of projects, offtakers, etc.
- Incentive duration
- Project eligibility
- Interoperability with other incentives
- Price setting
- Predictability of annual market scale



Example: Massachusetts SMART Program

General Incentive Type	Performance Based Incentive
Payment Structure	Tariff
Price-Setting Mechanism	 Competitive procurement for larger projects (>1 MW) for each EDC Administratively set for smaller projects as derivative
Price-Adjusting Mechanism	Capacity blocks with declining base compensation rates
Compensation Structure	Fixed compensation with payment mechanism contingent on type of underlying billing/tariff
Advantages	 Differentiation by project type, innovative adders and subtractors Long-term tariff provides certainty of incentive level Clear incentive blocks create incentive level certainty Program review every 400MW
Drawbacks	 Complex calculations and adders create confusion BTM/FTM differentiation created confusion and perverse incentives Uneven block reservations across utility service territories Program delays caused rapid block filling Utility tariff creates delays for program update to take effect

Example: Connecticut ZRECs

General Incentive Type	Performance Based Incentive
Payment Structure	 Large and Medium projects: 15-year contracts with EDC Small projects: Tariff
Price-Setting Mechanism	 Large and Medium projects: Competitive auction, receive bid price Smaller projects: Weighted average of medium ZRECs + 10% adder
Price-Adjusting Mechanism	• Price cap (2019: \$126/REC)
Compensation Structure	Fixed Premium (payments for environmental attribute)
Advantages	 Annual budget limit, price cap published pre-bid Receive bid price
Drawbacks	 Lottery based system – don't win the lottery, no access to the financial incentive Can be a race to the bottom - force project developers to bid below a financeable threshold in order to win



Example: Massachusetts SREC II

General Incentive Type	Market Mechanism	
Payment Structure	SREC market, auction with floor price	
Price-Setting Mechanism	Market-based function of supply/demand generally within SACP (ceiling) and Clearinghouse (floor)	
Price-Adjusting Mechanism	MW cap	
Compensation Structure	Premium	
Advantages	 Factorized SRECs provided adders and subtractors Clearinghouse last-resort auction "floor" reduces downside risk 	
Drawbacks	 Interactions with net metering caps in different EDC territories Auction floor mechanism, DOER forces it to clear Complicated 	



Example: NY-Sun C&I MW Block

General Incentive Type	Performance Based Incentive	
Payment Structure	Standard offer, first-come, first-served	
Price-Setting Mechanism	Administratively set based on historic demand, market potential, installed costs and equity	
Price-Adjusting Mechanism	Declining blocks, but NYSERDA monitors for adjustments	
Compensation Structure	Premium PBI	
Advantages	 Differentiation by region accounts for market/cost disparities Locational multipliers incentivize strategic development Redesign: adders, streamlined structure 	
Drawbacks	 Complexity of block design (→ redesign) Initial incentive levels based on old RNM rules Related interconnection costs and queue backlogs Pressure on C&I projects to pencil out economics (→ redesign) 	
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Example: Rhode Island REG

General Incentive Type	Performance Based Incentive	
Payment Structure	Tariff for 15 or 20 years	
Price-Setting Mechanism	 Standard Offer based on size: Larger: competitively bid up to a cost-based ceiling price Small (<25kW): Levelized, cost-based prices administratively set 	
Price-Adjusting Mechanism	Analyzed each year to determine ceiling prices	
Compensation Structure	Fixed compensation: full payment for on-bill credit for energy + PBI	
Advantages	 Bid requires completed interconnection, lowers cancelations Good diversity of project types 	
Drawbacks	 Oversubscriptions can push projects to NM, especially large ones C&I harder but may be aided by Commercial PACE Could use more carve-outs, e.g., LMI 	

Breakout Session

10:30 AM – 12:05 PM

- Listening session on policy pathway design choices
- Go to your assigned letter
- Spend 5 min. going through the worksheet
- Facilitators will lead discussion on design choices
- Share constructive thoughts on pros, cons, preferences, and experiences
- Prioritize preferred design choices
- Wrap up
- Breakout Session Debrief



Meeting Close





Thank You