# CADMUS

# NEW JERSEY SOLAR TRANSITION

# Successor Program Draft Capstone Report Review

August 20, 2020

# **OPENING REMARKS**




# Webinar Logistics

### Logistics:

- Please submit questions at any time during the meeting using the questions box on the right of your screen.
- Speakers will be called in the order in which they registered.
- The webinar is being recorded.





# Agenda

- 10:00 a.m. Welcome, Introductions, and Stakeholder Meeting Logistics
- 10:10 a.m.

Presentation by Cadmus of the draft Successor Program Capstone Report, followed by Q&A

Stakeholder comments

- 12:00 p.m. to 1:00 p.m. Lunch Break
- 3:00 p.m. Meeting Conclusion



# Next Steps

- Written Comments
  - Due on or before 10:00 a.m. on Monday, August 31, 2020
  - Please see the <u>Request for Comments</u> for instructions on how to submit comments.
- TREC Payment Portal Webinar
  - Friday, August 21 at 10:00 a.m.
  - <u>https://us02web.zoom.us/j/82628253060?pwd=WTdBTDVFSzVua1dsQ</u> <u>0IvZHNxdVNGdz09</u>
  - Meeting ID: 826 2825 3060
  - Passcode: 325493



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# Agenda

Opening Remarks Summary of Stakeholder Engagement Incentive Option Development Modeling Results Considerations & Recommendations

# Summary of Stakeholder Engagement

### **Initial Solar Transition Stakeholder engagement**

- Staff Straw Proposal
- Solar Industry Stakeholder Meeting
- Public Comment Stakeholder Meeting

### **Solar Transition Phase 1. Transition Incentive**

- Stakeholder Workshop #1: Priorities for the Solar Transition
- Cost & Technical Survey
- Stakeholder Workshop #2: Transition Incentive Program, potential Successor Program policy pathways
- Cost Cap Stakeholder Meeting
- 2019/2020 Transition Incentive Stakeholder Meetings
- Technical Modeling Conference
- Revised 2019/2020 Transition Incentive and Modeling Addendum Stakeholder Meeting

### Solar Transition Phase 2. Successor Program

- Stakeholder Workshop #3: Narrowing policy pathways for modeling of the Successor Program
- CEA's Statutory Cost Cap Stakeholder Meeting
- Successor Program's Incentive design Stakeholder Meeting
- Cost Survey
- · Focus Groups: Solar & Finance Industry, Utilities & Load Serving Entities, Utility Customers & Customer Advocates

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# Incentive Option Development

### Identify Successor Program Incentive Design Criteria

• Primary vs. Secondary Successor Plan Criteria

### **Review Range of Potential Design Options**

- Began with a broad list of solar incentives utilized in other markets
- Narrowed down to three selected incentive types:

**Total Compensation:** Total compensation incentives are performancebased incentive that utilizes a tariff payment structure, where the incentive acts like a contract for differences between the value of energy and the total compensation value paid to eligible projects.

**Fixed Incentive:** Fixed incentives offer set prices for environmental attributes and other value associated with production (kWh) from a solar array. The fixed incentive compensation is paid in addition to (i) any revenues the facility may earn, such as for sales of electricity, and (ii) any costs avoided through reduced energy consumption.

Market-Based RECs with Floor: Market-based RECs with a price floor necessarily requires the presence of an RPS. Regulated entities, which are typically electricity suppliers, meet compliance of an RPS by acquiring and retiring RECs that are generated through renewable energy production.

# **Incentive Option Development**

### **Incentive Types Chosen**

### **Total Compensation Incentive**

Advantages: Certainty, Flexibility, Transparency Disadvantages: Complexity, Timing Elements: Payment structure, price setting, price adjustment Examples: RI Renewable Energy Growth Program

### **Fixed Incentive**

Advantages: Reliability, Security, Simplicity Disadvantages: Determining appropriate price level, Maintenance, Longevity Elements: Payment structure, price setting, cost controls Examples: Connecticut ZRECs, NY-SUN C&I MW Block, Illinois Adjustable Block Program

### Market-Based RECs with Floor

Advantages: Demand, Stability, Competition Disadvantages: Volatility, Price-Setting Difficulty, Complexity Elements: Whether the price floor will be soft or firm, long-term contracts or tariffs, SREC factors Examples: Massachusetts SREC I and II

# **Comparison of PBIs (minimum incentives)**

- We reviewed SAM Cases on Monday: derivation, inputs, and modeling
- Now we provide a brief review of some initial results
- Provide comparisons for a sense of relative incentive needs
- Typical SAM Run "scenarios"
  - Subset of SAM Cases: Comm\_DO\_Roof\_med, Grid\_Ground, and Resi\_TPO\_Roof
  - Usually modeling 15-year incentive term

# **Draft results: comparing SAM Cases**

Some observations:

- DO typically lower than TPO counterparts
- Ground mounted generally lower with scale and optimal orientation
- Carports higher higher costs and suboptimal orientation
- Stepdown in ITC requires higher incentives
- Community Solar benefits from scale and blend with higher residential rates

	PBIs (\$/MWh)									
SAM Case		2020		2021						
Comm_DO_Ground_lg	\$	60	\$	65						
Comm_DO_Ground_med	\$	75	\$	80						
Comm_DO_Roof_lg	\$	65	\$	70						
Comm_DO_Roof_med	\$	80	\$	85						
Comm_DO_Roof_sm	\$	100	\$	110						
Comm_TPO_Carport	\$	170	\$	180						
Comm_TPO_Ground_Ig	\$	95	\$	105						
Comm_TPO_Ground_med	\$	135	\$	140						
Comm_TPO_Roof_Ig	\$	105	\$	110						
Comm_TPO_Roof_med	\$	135	\$	140						
Comm_TPO_Roof_sm	\$	150	\$	155						
CS_Ground	\$	50	\$	55						
CS_Roof_lg	\$	55	\$	60						
CS_Roof_med	\$	90	\$	100						
Grid_Ground	\$	85	\$	85						
Grid_Ground_OOS	\$	50	\$	50						
Grid_Roof	\$	90	\$	90						
Resi_DO_Roof [1]	\$	85	\$	95						
Resi_TPO_Roof	\$	85	\$	95						

#### Scenario information:

Incentive Type	
Incentive Term	
Modeling Year	
Utility	

Fixed Incentive 15 years [1] Years 1 and 2 PSEG

#### Notes:

1. Resi\_DO\_Roof has an incentive Term of 10 years, matching the target Payback Period (see Draft Capstone Report text for discussion).

# **Draft results: comparing incentives over time**

- Higher incentives in early years with stepdowns of ITC and bonus depreciation
- Longer-term decline reflects cost reductions and growth in electricity/PPA prices

SAM Case	2(	020	2	021	2	2022	2	2023	2	024	2	025	2	2026	2	.027	2	028	2	029	2	030
Comm_DO_Roof_med	\$	80	\$	85	\$	110	\$	105	\$	105	\$	105	\$	100	\$	100	\$	100	\$	95	\$	95
Grid_Ground	\$	85	\$	85	\$	100	\$	100	\$	100	\$	95	\$	95	\$	95	\$	95	\$	90	\$	90
Resi_TPO_Roof	\$	85	\$	95	\$	130	\$	125	\$	120	\$	120	\$	115	\$	110	\$	105	\$	100	\$	90

Scenario information:

Incentive Type	Fixed Incentive
Incentive Term	15 years
Modeling Year	All years
Utility	PSEG

# **Draft results: comparing incentive terms & types**

### Looking at incentive terms:

• Shorter incentive term typically requires higher incentive

	Incenti	ve۱	/ear
Representative SAM Cases	10 Years		15 Years
Comm_DO_Roof_med	\$ 80	\$	80
Grid_Ground	\$ 100	\$	85
Resi_TPO_Roof	\$ 105	\$	85

#### Scenario information:

Incentive Type	Fixed Incentive
Incentive Term	As indicated above
Modeling Year	Year1
Utility	PSEG

### Comparing incentive types:

Incentive types with higher risk require higher incentive

		Total		Μ	larket with
Representative SAM Cases	Com	pensation	Fixed PBI		Floor
Comm_DO_Roof_med	\$	75	\$ 80	\$	85
Grid_Ground	\$	70	\$ 85	\$	90
Resi_TPO_Roof	\$	55	\$ 85	\$	100

#### Scenario information:

Incentive Type	As indicated above
Incentive Term	15 years
Modeling Year	Year 1
Utility	PSEG

### **Draft results: comparing EDC rates**

- For commercial, PSEG is much lower electricity rate than the others, requiring higher incentives
- Residential and Large C&I more uniform

			Low	est Rate/High	est I	PBI		High	est Rate/Low	est	PBI
Representative SAM			Electricity Rate		PBI Incentive			Electricity Rate		P	BI Incentive
Cases	Service Class	Utility		(\$/kWh)		(\$/MWh)	Utility		(\$/kWh)		(\$/MWh)
Resi_TPO_Roof	Residential [1]	JCPL	\$	0.1426	\$	130	ACE	\$	0.1899	\$	70
Comm_DO_Roof_med	Commercial [1]	PSEG	\$	0.0634	\$	80	ACE	\$	0.1550	\$	-
Comm_DO_Roof_lg	Large C&I [2]	PSEG	\$	0.0473	\$	65	ACE	\$	0.0580	\$	45

Scenario information:

Incentive Type	Fixed Incentive
Incentive Term	15 years
Modeling Year	Year 1
Utility	As indicated above

#### <u>Notes</u>

1. Electricity rates from OpenEl via SAM.

2. Derived from EDCs' tariffs.

# Considerations

## **Selected Material Considerations**

### COVID-19

While the ultimate impact of the global pandemic may take months or longer to emerge, various constraints or political/business reactions to the virus have already imposed or could foreseeably result in a number of material issues for the solar industry.

### **ITC Stepdown**

The credit step-down will likely pose significant implications for project economics and financing structures. Further, the COVID-19 pandemic may result in compounding effects in terms of availability of taxable income, tax equity capital, and access to bank debt.

### **Ongoing Cost Cap Proceedings**

BPU currently engages in proceedings and internal discussions regarding calculation of the Cost Cap imposed by the CEA.

### Section 201 Tariffs

Trade tariffs placed on cells and modules imported from China have disrupted project procurement, prompted some domestic production, and created greater pricing uncertainty.

### **FERC Orders**

The recent FERC decision on MOPR could substantially constrain or eliminate a revenue stream for grid supply projects, even with potential adjustments for solar's estimated cost.

# Recommendations

Based on stakeholder feedback, analysis of New Jersey's (and other state) programs, and modeling at project and market levels, Cadmus provides the following primary recommendations:

- Maintain flexibility
- Implement a Fixed Incentive program as a first stage, moving towards a Total Compensation paradigm
- Deploy a mix of competitive solicitations and administratively set incentives
- Maintain robust estimates of project economics
- Differentiate the incentive between project types
- Differentiate the incentive between utility territories

# Recommendations

# **Primary Recommendations Continued**

- Consider treating DO systems differently
- Conduct a market potential study
- Coordinate with related programs
  - Utilities
  - Net metering
  - Other clean energy programs and policy goals
  - Energy Storage
- Evaluate incentives relative to those in the Transition Incentive
- Create working groups for on-going discussions



# Thank You

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